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I. INTRODUCTION 
Debt recharacterization occurs when a court reclassifies a 
claimant’s debt claim as an equity interest.1  That ostensibly nominal 
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 1 In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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classification is rendered significant because of the Bankruptcy Code’s 
priority scheme, which calls for the repayment of debt claims before 
equity interests.2  In an asset distribution, a debt claim that has been 
recharacterized as an equity interest necessarily loses its priority status, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of it being repaid.3 
Until recently, the circuits generally agreed that bankruptcy courts’ 
recharacterization authority stemmed from the equitable authority grant 
in § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code.4  The Fifth Circuit ended that 
consensus when it shoehorned § 502 into the debt recharacterization 
analysis.5  Directing bankruptcy courts to categorize a claim or interest 
before allowing it to proceed under § 502,6 the Fifth Circuit found that an 
equity interest held by a non-insider did not constitute a claim and, as a 
result, could not proceed under § 502.7  In essence, the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision meant that a court’s categorization of a claim or interest became 
dispositive.8 
In transposing the equitable authority to recharacterize a debt claim 
from § 105 to § 502, the Fifth Circuit has molded an approach that will 
likely produce overwhelmingly negative ramifications for businesses.9  
Its adoption by other courts will lead to the unfair penalization of non-
insiders whose funds are often necessary to keep flailing businesses 
afloat.10  Additionally, the Lothian approach would force bankruptcy 
courts to deal with complex issues at the front end of the case, thereby 
denying claimants the right to proceed with their claims.11 
This article evaluates the two approaches for determining the 
appropriate instance in which to consider debt recharacterization and 
ultimately rejects the approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit.  Part I 
introduces the concept of debt recharacterization and its significance.  
Part II analyzes the disparate approaches that courts have developed.  
Part III examines the Lothian approach and the implications of its 
                                                                                                             
 2 11 U.S.C. § 726. 
 3 In re AutoStyle Plastics, 269 F.3d at 749. 
 4 See, e.g., id.; In re Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors for Dornier Aviation 
(N. Am.), Inc., 453 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2006) [hereinafter In re Dornier Aviation, Inc.]; In 
re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 5 See In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 539 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 6 Id. 
 7 In re Lothian Oil, 650 F.3d at 543. 
 8 See infra Part II.B. 
 9 James M. Wilton & Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt Recharacterization Under State 
Law, 62 BUS. LAW. 1257, 1278 (2007). 
 10 See infra Part III.B. 
 11 See infra Part III.B. 
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adoption.  The article concludes with a recommendation against adoption 
of the Fifth Circuit’s approach to debt recharacterization. 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE SOURCE OF BANKRUPTCY COURTS’ DEBT 
RECHARACTERIZATION ANALYSIS 
A. The Traditional Approach: Authority to Recharacterize Grounded in 
§ 105(a) 
The majority of circuits that have addressed the question cite 
§ 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) as the source of 
bankruptcy courts’ recharacterization authority.12  The most compelling 
reason for embracing § 105(a) is found in In re Dornier Aviation (North 
America), Inc., a Fourth Circuit decision issued in 2006.13  The language 
of § 105(a) clearly states that a bankruptcy court has the equitable 
authority to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”14  The Fourth Circuit 
understood § 105(a) to be a broad provision that vested bankruptcy 
courts with far-reaching powers.15  The expansiveness of § 105(a) is 
evidenced by its minimal requirements for the type of judgments it 
allows.  That is to say, under § 105(a), a judgment need only be 
appropriate—not necessary—for furthering the objectives of the Code. 
Congress intended for § 105(a) to give bankruptcy courts the 
equitable authority necessary to issue judgments aimed at implementing 
the priority scheme set forth in § 726.16  In fact, the Fourth Circuit noted 
that “implementation of the Code’s priority scheme requires a 
determination of whether a particular obligation is debt or equity.  
Where, as here, the question is in dispute, the bankruptcy court must 
have the authority to make this determination in order to preserve the 
Code’s priority scheme.”17  The Fourth Circuit reemphasized the 
importance of upholding the Code’s intentions when it asserted: “In light 
of the broad language of § 105(a) and the larger purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Code, we believe that a bankruptcy court’s power to 
                                                                                                             
 12 See, e.g., In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 744 (6th Cir. 2001); In re 
Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2006); In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 
F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 13 In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 231. 
 14 Id. (emphasis added). 
 15 See id. (“In our view, recharacterization is well within the broad powers afforded a 
bankruptcy court in § 105(a) and facilitates the application of the priority scheme laid out 
in § 726.”). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
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recharacterize is essential to the proper and consistent application of the 
Code.”18 
To buttress its grounding such authority in § 105(a), the Fourth 
Circuit touched on the insufficiency of § 502(b) for achieving that 
purpose.  Significantly, the Fourth Circuit did not explicitly denounce 
§ 502(b) as the basis for recharacterization.19  Instead, the court 
concluded that an analysis under § 502(b) was only the first of a two-step 
process.20  Thereafter, a court must address the issue of 
recharacterization, whose analysis occurs under § 105(a).  The Fourth 
Circuit held, “[e]ven if a claimant is able to meet § 502’s minimal 
threshold for allowance of the claim, the bankruptcy court still must look 
beyond the form of the transaction to determine the claim’s proper 
priority.”21  The Fourth Circuit concluded that bankruptcy courts should 
not consider recharacterization under § 502(b), because 
recharacterization does not determine a claim’s allowance.22  Instead, 
bankruptcy courts should postpone the recharacterization analysis until it 
becomes necessary for establishing a priority scheme for claims.23  
According to the Fourth Circuit’s articulate analysis, bankruptcy courts 
cannot examine recharacterization under § 502(b) without accounting for 
§ 105(a).24 
B. Transition to Lothian (Equity Is Not a Claim Under § 502) 
Indubitably, the Dornier court offered impelling reasons for the 
need to go beyond § 502(b) in determining recharacterization.  
Nevertheless, other courts have made compelling arguments for ending 
the inquiry at § 502(b) by expounding upon the definition of “claim” as it 
pertains to that provision.25  By assuming a limited definition of the word 
“claim,” some courts have determined that, because equity interests are 
not claims, they cannot pass the threshold requirements for allowability 
under § 502(b).26  The putative claim’s inability to survive § 502(b) 
                                                                                                             
 18 Id. at 231. 
 19 See generally In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 231. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 232. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id.  Bankruptcy courts determine the priority scheme pursuant to § 726; however, 
§ 726 does not provide for recharacterization of claims.  Instead, the courts derive their 
authority to recharacterize from § 105(a), the equitable authority provision.  See id. 
 24 Id. at 232. 
 25 In re Georgetown Bldg. Assocs., 240 B.R. 124, 138 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1999). 
 26 Id. (citing Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle Street 
Partnership, 526 U.S. 434 (1999) (applying the term “interest” as contained in 11 U.S.C. 
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necessarily obviates any need for analysis under § 105(a).27  According 
to that line of thought, the definition of “claim” includes debt claims but 
excludes equity interests.28  One court explained: 
Although 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5) and 101(12) define “claim” as a 
right to payment and “debt” as liability on a claim, these 
definitions obviously do not include a right to payment based on 
an equity security or other interest in the debtor arising from 
capital contributions.  That the interest in the debtor gives rise to 
a right to payment does not make that interest a claim.29 
The court provided only a vague explanation of how it reached the 
conclusion that the definition of “claim” obviously excludes equity 
interests.30  The court opined that the Code intended to exclude equity 
holders from bringing claims for the repayment of debt in bankruptcy.31  
The court made that assumption based upon a provision in § 1129(a)(10) 
which states that confirmation of a repayment plan requires acceptance 
by one or more classes of claims.32  The court then asserted, “acceptance 
by a class of interests does not suffice.”33  The court failed to 
acknowledge, however, the possibility that those two concepts are not, in 
fact, mutually exclusive. 
The Sixth Circuit has entertained the idea of disallowing so-called 
claims for equity interest under § 502(b) more than once.34  In an 
unpublished decision, the Sixth Circuit opined, “a claim seeking to 
recharacterize debt to equity is the same as objecting to the claim’s 
‘allowance.’”35  The court reached that conclusion after deciding that a 
recharacterization from debt to equity nullifies a claim.36  The court 
explained that “[a] debtor’s request to recharacterize a claim is a request 
for the bankruptcy court to hold a debt, and hence any claim, is non-
                                                                                                             
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (“retain under the plan on account of such . . . interest any 
property”))); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988). 
 27 See In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748–49 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 28 In re Georgetown Bldg. Assocs., 240 B.R. at 138. 
 29 Id. at 139 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), (12) (1994)). 
 30 See id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 124 n.25. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748–49 (6th Cir. 2001); see 
generally In re Russell Cave Co., 107 F. App’x 449 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 35 In re Russell Cave, 107 F. App’x at 451 (citing In re MicroPrecision Tech., Inc., 
303 B.R. 238, 243 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2003)). 
 36 Id. (citing In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 748–49; In re Georgetown 
Bldg. Assocs., 240 B.R. at 137); 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), (12) (defining “claim” as a right to 
payment and “debt” as liability on a claim). 
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existent.”37  In other words, while a creditor can bring a claim for debt, 
an equity holder cannot bring a claim.38  Accordingly, recharacterization 
from debt to equity eliminates the claim in its entirety.39 
Despite the Sixth Circuit’s ostensible advocacy of using only 
§ 502(b), both in AutoStyle Plastics and Russell Cave, it stated in 
AutoStyle that authority “stems from the authority vested in the 
bankruptcy courts to use their equitable powers to test the validity of 
debts.  The source of the court’s general equitable powers is § 105 of the 
Code . . . .”40  That statement seems to contradict the Sixth Circuit’s later 
suggestion that analysis under § 502(b) is sufficient.41  If reclassifying 
the debt claim under § 502(b) bars the claim from proceeding, then the 
claim would never even reach analysis under § 105(a).42 
For all of its discrepancies, the Sixth Circuit is not the only pre-
Lothian court to indicate that the inquiry stops at § 502(b).43  In 1999, 
one bankruptcy court articulated: 
[I]f a particular advance is a capital contribution, it never 
becomes a claim.  The debt-versus-equity inquiry is not an 
exercise in recharacterizing a claim, but of characterizing the 
advance’s true character.  If the advance is not a claim to begin 
with, then equitable subordination never comes into play.44 
Classifying a claim as equity does not relieve a debtor from his 
obligation to repay the claimant, but it does prevent the claim from 
proceeding within the realm of bankruptcy.45  When a court classifies a 
purported debt claim as an equity interest, the putative claimant no 
longer has a claim.  Instead, he holds an interest in equity. 
                                                                                                             
 37 In re Russell Cave, 107 F. App’x at 451; see also In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 
F.3d at 748–49. 
 38 See In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 748–49. 
 39 Id. at 749; see also In re Georgetown Bldg. Assocs., 240 B.R. at 126 (“[Claimant] 
first claims that the notes should be characterized as equity instead of debt, such that they 
are not claims in the case.  [Claimant] claims alternatively that if the notes are 
characterized as debt and hence constitute claims in the case, the obligations nevertheless 
are subject to equitable or contractual subordination behind [claimant’s] claims.”). 
 40 In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 748. 
 41 In re Russell Cave Co., 107 F. App’x at 451 (citing In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 
269 F.3d at 748–49) (“A debtor’s request to recharacterize a claim is a request for the 
bankruptcy court to hold a debt, and hence any claim, is non-existent.”). 
 42 In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 43 See, e.g., In re Georgetown Bldg. Assocs., 240 B.R. at 137; In re Russell Cave Co., 
107 F. App’x at 449. 
 44 In re Georgetown Bldg. Assocs., 240 B.R. at 137. 
 45 Id. at 138 (“The classification of obligations as debt or equity is not a defense to 
the obligation; it is simply a function of administering the relations between creditors and 
equity interest holders.”). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Analysis of the Lothian Approach 
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the phrase “applicable law” refers 
to state law in Lothian.46  The court relied heavily on the idea that 
“Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the 
assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law.”47  Recognizing that the 
reasoning in Butner pertained to property rights, the Fifth Circuit 
understood the Butner reasoning to apply equally to bankruptcy 
proceedings.48  In making that connection, the court cited part of the 
Butner decision explaining that “there is no reason why such [state law] 
interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested 
party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”49  Therefore, the court 
assumed that the applicable law is, in fact, state law, excepting a 
congressional statement to the contrary.50 
The Fifth Circuit is no longer alone in its reliance on Butner.51  
Following in the footsteps of its sister circuit, the Ninth Circuit reached 
the same conclusion in 2013, when it issued its decision in Fitness 
Holdings.52  In Fitness Holdings, the debtor corporation was financed 
primarily by two sources, with whom it entered into numerous loan 
agreements, which it later refinanced.53  Although the debtor continued 
to make payments on its refinanced loans, its financial situation 
continued to deteriorate, eventually resulting in bankruptcy.54  The 
committee of unsecured creditors brought action to avoid the pre-petition 
                                                                                                             
 46 In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Butner v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id.  Compare In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d at 543 (holding that, under the 
Butner principle, courts are required to define claims by reference to state law, and are 
thus required to recharacterize purported “debt” as equity where state law would treat the 
asserted interest as an equity interest), with In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 
455 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a court has the equitable authority to recharacterize a 
transaction and determine if it is more like “debt” or “equity”), and In re AutoStyle 
Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 749–50 (announcing an eleven-factor test, derived from federal 
tax law, for determining whether a purported “debt” is in fact “equity”).  See generally In 
re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting the presence 
of a circuit split regarding which legal framework courts should apply in recharacterizing 
claims). 
 51 See In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d at 1146–47. 
 52 Id. at 1148. 
 53 Id. at 1143. 
 54 Id. at 1144. 
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loan repayments, arguing that such transfers were not, in fact, loan 
repayments but rather fraudulent transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a).55  
The court found that the outcome rested on whether such transfers were 
considered “claims” under the Bankruptcy Code.56  Applying Butner, the 
Ninth Circuit advised that “a court must determine whether the asserted 
interest in the debtor’s assets is a ‘right to payment’ recognized under 
state law.”57  According to the Ninth Circuit, Butner meant that for 
purposes of bankruptcy law, whether or not a transfer constituted a claim 
turned on state property law.58 
The court concluded that, in combination with the Butner decision, 
§ 502(b) affords bankruptcy courts the power to recharacterize debt 
claims of corporate non-insiders.59  Because applicable law means state 
law, bankruptcy courts must disallow any claim that contravenes state 
law.60  Before disallowing such a claim, however, the bankruptcy court 
must determine why state law prohibits such claims.61  More specifically, 
“where the reason for such disallowance is that state law classifies the 
interest as equity rather than debt, then implementing state law as 
envisioned in Butner requires different treatment than simply disallowing 
the claim.”62  A bankruptcy court, in disallowing a claim, causes the 
claim to be dismissed in its entirety.63  Total dismissal precludes a 
claimant from asserting any other rights against the debtor.64  The 
Lothian court bemoaned the severity of such a result.65  A bankruptcy 
court cannot ignore the attendant rights of a claimant whose principal 
claim it disallowed for contravening state law.66  The court opined, 
                                                                                                             
 55 Id. at 1147. 
 56 Id. 
 57 In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d at 1147. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 1148 (“We agree with the approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Lothian 
Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d at 543, which is consistent with the Butner principle.”). 
 60 In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F. 3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id.  The Lothian court also distinguished that “[o]ther circuits to have considered 
this issue have approved recharacterization, but they have generally grounded it in the 
bankruptcy courts’ equitable authority under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).”  Id. (citing In re 
SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006); In re Dornier Aviation, 
Inc., 453 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2006); In re Hedged–Invs. Assocs., 380 F.3d 1292, 1292 
(10th Cir. 2004); In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748–49 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
 63 In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F. 3d at 543 (citing In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 
F.3d at 232). 
 64 Id. 
 65 See id. 
 66 In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d at 543 (citing In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 
F.3d at 232). 
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“[t]hese rights, fixed by state law, are not irrelevant to the court’s 
decision to disallow a claim.  To the contrary, recharacterizing the claim 
as an equity interest is the logical outcome of the reason for disallowing 
it as debt.”67 
The Lothian court’s reliance on Butner introduces several 
problems.  First, Butner did not involve any recharacterization issues.  
The case examined property interests outside the realm of bankruptcy.  
Second, the Supreme Court issued the Butner decision before the 
promulgation of the Code.  In effect, the Lothian court relied on a non-
bankruptcy case to evaluate issues that are grounded in a statute not then 
in existence.  Determining the proper Code provision is an undeniably 
challenging task for any court.  The Fifth Circuit should not use that as 
an excuse to delegate that burden to the states. 
The inapplicability of the facts in Butner to those in Lothian 
presents an ancillary problem.  Butner concerned a bankrupt landowner 
who had defaulted on both of his mortgages and owed the petitioner 
money.68  The petitioner requested that the bankrupt landowner repay the 
petitioner using rent earned on the property.69  The bankruptcy court 
denied the petitioner’s claim, holding that the petitioner had no security 
interest on that rent, and that the rent profits should therefore be 
distributed in the same manner as an unsecured claim.70  The case finally 
reached the Supreme Court, which held that “Congress has generally left 
the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to 
state law.”71 
That issue has little relevance to the issue at bar in Lothian.  In 
Butner, the Court evaluated an existing interest to determine whether it 
was secured.72  The Court was not tasked with classifying a purported 
                                                                                                             
 67 Id. 
 68 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 48 (1979). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 54 (“The constitutional authority of Congress to establish ‘uniform Laws on 
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States’ would clearly encompass a 
federal statute defining the mortgagee’s interest in the rents and profits earned by 
property in a bankrupt estate.”) (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4).  Congress could 
have chosen to pass legislation regarding the distribution of rent earned from a bankrupt’s 
land; however, Congress did not exercise that authority.  Therefore, state law controls the 
issue.  See id. at 54 n.9 (“In view of this grant of authority to the Congress it has been 
settled from an early date that state laws to the extent that they conflict with the laws of 
Congress, enacted under its constitutional authority, on the subject of bankruptcies are 
suspended.  While this is true, state laws are thus suspended only to the extent of actual 
conflict with the system provided by the Bankruptcy Act of Congress.”). 
 72 Id. at 48. 
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debt interest and therefore never even broached the issue of debt 
recharacterization.73  In Lothian, on the other hand, the court had to 
figure out whether the purported loan even constituted a property 
interest.74  It seems overly academic to contemplate whether a property 
interest is secured before knowing that a property interest even exists. 
The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on one statement in the Butner 
opinion: “Property interests are created and defined by state law.  Unless 
some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why 
such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an 
interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”75  Taken out of 
context, that statement could be read as applying broadly to all 
bankruptcy cases.  More likely than not, however, the Court simply 
meant to say that with respect to property rights, one’s status as bankrupt 
or non-bankrupt should not affect the outcome of the case.76  The Butner 
decision addressed potential remedies for a mortgagor who lacks any 
security interest on the rent profits of his mortgagee.77  The Lothian 
decision, on the other hand, evaluated the potential extension of debt 
recharacterization to non-insiders.78  The notion of insiders and non-
insiders is salient in the Lothian decision,79 but does not appear even 
once in Butner.80 
Regardless of the possible inapplicability of Butner, the resolution 
of the debt recharacterization issue in Lothian remains unsolved.  Butner 
instructed courts to apply state law in decisions regarding the property 
rights of bankrupt debtors.81  The Fifth Circuit did follow the Butner rule 
and applied Texas law to the facts of the case.82  At best, reliance on 
Butner does nothing more than elucidate how a particular state would 
resolve the issue.  In Lothian, the court noted that “[t]o distinguish 
between debt and equity, Texas courts have imported a multi-factor test 
                                                                                                             
 73 See generally id. 
 74 In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 75 Butner, 440 U.S. at 55. 
 76 See id. (“Uniform treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts 
within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent 
a party from receiving ‘a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of 
bankruptcy.’”) (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Ntn’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)). 
 77 Id. at 48. 
 78 In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F. 3d at 543. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 48. 
 81 Id. at 54.  See supra note 71. 
 82 In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F. 3d at 544. 
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from federal tax law.”83  The court justified its derivation of tax-law tests 
by citing other bankruptcy cases that had proposed using some form of 
the Roth Steel factors.84  By suggesting use of the 11-factor test 
promulgated in Roth Steel and endorsed by the Sixth Circuit in AutoStyle 
Plastics, the Lothian court does nothing to show that recharacterization is 
based in § 502 rather than § 105.85 
B. Implications of Adopting the Lothian Approach 
If recharacterization, allowance, and equitable subordination all 
lead to the same result, should anyone care which Code section the 
courts use to justify their holdings?  In short: yes.  In Lothian, the Fifth 
Circuit held that bankruptcy courts could end the recharacterization 
inquiry at § 502(b) without ever considering the intricacies of § 105(a).86  
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit disregarded the potentially dire 
ramifications of its holding.  In practice, application of the Lothian 
approach would result in a slew of changes for bankruptcy courts, 
debtors, creditors, and the general public.  Some of those changes might 
prove beneficial; however, adopting the approach would have a negative 
net impact.  Preserving the traditional approach, on the other hand, will 
allow for more uniformity and predictability in the realm of debt 
recharacterization. 
Many scholars agree that “[b]ankruptcy is crucial to the functioning 
of credit markets and the reallocation of capital.  As such, consistency in 
                                                                                                             
 83 Id. (citing Arch Petroleum, Inc. v. Sharp, 958 S.W.2d 475, 477 n.3 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1997)). 
 84 Id; see also, e.g., In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., Inc., 380 F.3d 1292, 1298 (10th Cir. 
2004); Jones v. United States, 659 F.2d 618, 622 n.12 (5th Cir. 1981).  The “Roth Steel” 
factors form the basis of a recharacterization analysis when a bankruptcy court is 
exercising its § 105 equitable authority.  Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 800 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987).  The 
“Roth Steel” factors were formulated in a tax court case and subsequently applied to 
assessing recharacterization claims in the bankruptcy context.  There are eleven 
nondispositive factors: (1) the names given to the debt instruments; (2) the presence or 
absence of a fixed maturity date and schedule of payments; (3) the presence or absence of 
a fixed rate of interest and interest payments; (4) the source of repayments; (5) the 
adequacy capitalization; (6) the identity of interest between the creditor and the 
stockholder; (7) collateralized advances; (8) the corporation’s ability to obtain financing 
from outside lending institutions; (9) the extent to which the advances were subordinated 
to the claims of outside creditors; (10) the extent to which the advances were used to 
acquire capital assets; and (11) the presence or absence of a sinking fund to provide 
repayments.  Id. 
 85 See In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748 (6th Cir. 2001) (advocating 
use of the Roth Steel factors to determine the appropriateness of debt recharacterization) 
(citing Roth Steel Tube Co., 800 F.2d at 625 (6th Cir. 1986)). 
 86 In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d at 543. 
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the application of bankruptcy law is of critical importance to the smooth 
and unfettered conduct of business.”87  No one disputes the importance 
of uniformity and predictability in the bankruptcy system; however, there 
is disagreement as to which approach will result in the desired 
uniformity.88  The traditional approach suggests that bankruptcy courts 
derive their recharacterization authority from federal law, citing § 105(a) 
as the source of that authority.89  Those holdings stand in sharp contrast 
with the conflicting but nonetheless popular notion that 
recharacterization authority must stem from state law.90 
Proponents of the Lothian approach mistakenly believe that 
deference to state law will generate a more predictable bankruptcy 
system.  In an avant-garde article, James Wilton and Stephen Moeller-
Sally argue that state law “offers a higher degree of predictability 
concerning the enforcement of insider debt and may serve as a means for 
reconciling the conflicting and inconsistent tests applied by the federal 
courts.”91  Interwoven in this argument are three separate, albeit related, 
points from that assertion.  First, Wilton and Moeller-Sally believe that 
applying state law will result in greater predictability than that which 
exists in the current system.92  Second, the authors maintain that the 
                                                                                                             
 87 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lothian Cassidy, L.L.C. v. Lothian Oil, Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1573 (2011) (No. 11-792), 2011 WL 6468137 at *18; see, e.g., James M. Wilton & 
Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt Recharacterization under State Law, 62 BUS. LAW. 1257, 
1279 (2007); David Gray Carlson, Debt Collection As Rent Seeking, 79 MINN. L. REV. 
817, 836–37 (1995) (asserting that the major purpose of federal bankruptcy law is to 
guarantee competitive conditions in a national credit market); Note, Switching Priorities: 
Elevating the Status of Tort Claims in Bankruptcy in Pursuit of Optimal Deterrence, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 2541, 2548 (2003) (concluding that the effects of the Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 11  priority schemes have significant effects on the credit market). 
 88 Compare Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 87, at 1257, 1278 (arguing that 
uniform treatment of state-created property interests, by both state and federal courts 
within a state, will achieve uniformity within the bankruptcy system, rather than 
inconsistent federal case law), with In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d 225, 232 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (holding that § 105(a) of the Code authorizes bankruptcy courts to 
recharacterize debt claims). 
 89 See, e.g., In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 225; In re AutoStyle Plastics, 
Inc., 269 F.3d at 745; In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., 380 F.3d at 1292. 
 90 See In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d at 543; Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 
87, at 1257; Niel M. Peretz, Recharacterization in the Ninth Circuit: Has the Supreme 
Court Finally Derailed the Pacific Express?, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2 Art. 4 (arguing 
that the Ninth Circuit should recognize debt recharacterization because it has firm support 
in applicable state law). 
 91 Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 87, at 1257. 
 92 Id. at 1278 (“These [multi-factor] tests fail in the most important respect that legal 
standards can fail—they are vague and do not permit accurate prediction of the outcome 
of future cases.”). 
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current system entails federal courts applying inconsistent tests.93  
Finally, the authors suggest that use of state law is a convenient way to 
fix the problem of inconsistency.94 
Wilton and Moeller-Sally have communicated what they perceive 
to be the two greatest shortcomings of the current system: the variation 
that exists in the number of factors considered and the weight ascribed to 
each.95  Such differentiation, the authors bemoan, leads to inconsistent 
results that provide no guidance to potential lenders.96  By considering 
the facts on a case-by-case basis, the courts have rendered the multi-
factor test an ineffective guide for predicting the outcome of a case.97  
Wilton and Moeller-Sally suggest that “[t]he difficulty that courts have 
encountered in consistently applying the Roth Steel factors in bankruptcy 
cases may arise, in part, from what some courts have opined is an 
improper application of tax court precedents in the very different context 
of priority disputes in bankruptcy.”98  The authors argue that some of 
those factors are irrelevant or even injurious to a bankruptcy case.99  
Given the purported discretion of the judges with regard to which factors 
to apply and how heavily to weight them, extraneous factors should not 
diminish the courts’ ability to apply the test. 
The authors preemptively reject the possibility of applying the 
multi-factor test in a more rigid fashion.100  An inflexible application of 
the multi-factor test, the authors warn, would not account for the 
complex nature of debt and equity instruments.101  They emphasize that 
debt and equity lie on a continuum and are not separated by any fixed 
line of demarcation.  Determining the appropriate label, therefore, 
necessitates the use of a flexible test allowing for the consideration of the 
facts specific to the case.102  Although the authors make an important 
point, it does nothing to strengthen their argument, because federal courts 
do not apply the multi-factor test in such a rigid manner. 
                                                                                                             
 93 Id. (“To the extent that the Roth Steel factors render uncertain the enforceability of 
debt instruments with conventional debt terms, state law is improperly preempted.”). 
 94 Id. at 1279. 
 95 Id. at 1263; see also Hilary A. Goehausen, Comment, You Said You Were Going 
To Do What To My Loan? The Inequitable Doctrine of Recharacterization, 4 DEPAUL 
BUS. & COM. L.J. 117 (2005). 
 96 Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 87, at 1263–64. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 1265. 
 99 Id. at 1266. 
 100 Id. at 1263. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 87, at 1263. 
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Despite their assertion that the multi-factor test results in 
inconsistency and unpredictability, the authors propose an alternative 
that would exacerbate those problems.  Turning to state law imposes two 
major issues concerning inconsistency.  Most significantly, by 
propagating multitudinous recharacterization tests, such a system would 
deter potential lenders by generating confusion as to which state’s law 
will govern their contribution.  The transactions surrounding a financial 
contribution to a corporation are not confined to any particular state.  
More likely than not, the transaction will implicate the laws of numerous 
states.  If the laws conflict with each other, how does one determine 
which law to apply?  Does applicable law mean the debtor’s state of 
incorporation?  What about the place in which the debtor conducts its 
business?  Perhaps the contributor’s state of domicile should determine 
the applicable law.  Then again, the state in which the contributor 
executed the documentation might prove more relevant.  What if a bank 
facilitated the transaction?  Should courts consider the bank’s charter 
state? 
To support their conclusion Wilton and Moeller-Sally point to the 
Supreme Court case of Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue, which 
involved a tax-evading corporation in bankruptcy.103    The case did not 
address recharacterization.104  The Raleigh Court concluded courts 
should apply state law to the substance of a claim, unless the Code would 
suggest a different result.105  Where a federal interest contradicts the state 
law, the federal interest must prevail.106  Unlike the law at issue in 
Raleigh, debt recharacterization is implicitly addressed in the Code.107  
Therefore, the holding in Raleigh provides neither binding nor 
particularly persuasive precedent for the debt recharacterization issue. 
Several circuits have agreed that the requirements of allowability 
under § 502 are minimal.108  The low threshold imposed by § 502 results 
                                                                                                             
 103 Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 15 (2000). 
 104 See generally id. (construing a state law that shifted the burden of proof from the 
government to the person responsible for the tax evasion). 
 105 Id.  In Raleigh, the Illinois law at issue was not contravened by any provision in 
the Code.  By addressing issues of burden of proof arising from other situations, the 
Code’s silence on this issue is particularly telling. As a result, the court found that the 
state law should prevail.  Id. at 26. 
 106 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
 107 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006) (granting bankruptcy courts with the equitable 
authority necessary to carry out the provisions of the Code, including the priority scheme 
set forth in § 726). 
 108 See, e.g., In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d 225, 225 (4th Cir. 2006); In re 
AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748–49 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Hedged-Invs. 
Assocs., 380 F.3d 1292, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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in an increasing number of claims being allowed by bankruptcy courts.109  
If debt recharacterization requires nothing more than surviving § 502(b) 
allowability, then the requirements for debt recharacterization will be 
similarly minimal.  Ending the inquiry at § 502(b) would mean that 
bankruptcy courts would have to allow every claim for which an 
exception did not apply, unless the applicable state law would not 
characterize that claim as an equity interest.110  Adopting the Lothian 
approach could lead to serious repercussions.  Those repercussions will 
most likely stem from the two most obvious aspects of the holding in 
Lothian: the increased reliance on state law and the minimal 
requirements imposed by § 502. 
One foreseeable ramification of adopting the Lothian approach 
involves the elevation of state law to a status that could render Code 
provisions redundant.  Except for a fairly significant caveat relating to 
state law, the Lothian court found that § 502(b) gives bankruptcy courts 
the authority to recharacterize debt claims as interests in equity.111  The 
caveat to that rule comes from the Butner decision.112  According to 
Lothian court, Butner instructs that bankruptcy courts can only 
recharacterize debt claims if the applicable state law would also classify 
them as equity interests.113  In practice, this means allowing those claims 
that state law would allow and disallowing those claims that state law 
would prohibit.  That understanding of the Butner opinion propels state 
law to such an elevation that it takes precedent over provisions in the 
Code.  The Code was enacted, in part, to generate uniformity in 
bankruptcy law.114  By instructing bankruptcy courts to look for solutions 
in state law rather than Code provisions, the Lothian approach 
contravenes the fundamental purpose of the Code.  Rather than solving 
debt-versus-equity inquiry, the Lothian approach relegates that task to 
the states. 
The second troublesome aspect of the Lothian holding involves the 
potential ramifications of grounding courts’ authority for 
recharacterization in a Code provision whose requirements are so 
                                                                                                             
 109 See, e.g., In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 225; In re AutoStyle Plastics, 
Inc., 269 F.3d at 748–49; In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., 380 F.3d at 1292; In re First NLC 
Fin. Servs., LLC, 396 B.R. 562, 570–71 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008); In re Commonwealth 
Biotechnologies, Inc., Bankruptcy No. 11-30381-KRH, 2012 WL 5385632, *6 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. Nov. 1, 2012). 
 110 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2006); see Butner, 440 U.S. at 54. 
 111 In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1978). 
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negligible.  This could play out in a number of ways.  While its effects 
would most likely prove injurious, favorable consequences could also 
ensue.  For instance, the imposition of a minimal threshold requirement 
could lead to a reduction in the amount of time that courts spend on 
recharacterization claims.  By ending the recharacterization inquiry in 
§ 502(b), bankruptcy courts could avoid the potentially time consuming 
analysis in § 105(a).115  If every analysis under § 105(a) requires a 
determination of whether the proposed recharacterization furthers the 
purpose of the Code, one can imagine courts expending a lot of resources 
here.116  Alleviating the time pressures faced by bankruptcy courts is an 
admirable goal.  However, if courts agree that implementing the priority 
scheme of § 726 is an objective of the Code,117 the time spent analyzing 
recharacterization under § 105(a) would be negligible.  Furthermore, 
§ 502(b) calls for the evaluation of recharacterization as part of the 
allowability determination.  The time spent considering 
recharacterization under § 105(a), while relegated to an earlier stage in 
the process, does not cease to exist. 
In practice, it seems much more likely that any positive 
ramifications resulting from the circumvention of an analysis under 
§ 105(a) would pale in comparison to the concomitant results of this 
approach—namely, the profusion of recharacterization claims.  If the 
threshold requirements of § 502(b) are as minimal as most courts have 
assumed,118 then recharacterization cannot serve as a factor that limits 
allowability.  That means that the number of claims allowed under 
§ 502(b) will not significantly diminish as a result of adopting the 
Lothian approach.  Because the Lothian approach compels 
recharacterization for any claim allowed to proceed under § 502(b), 
recharacterization would become more commonplace.  That, in turn, 
would have a negative effect on business, shareholders, and the public at 
large. 
                                                                                                             
 115 See In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 231. 
 116 See id.  Bankruptcy courts’ equitable authority under § 105(a) is limited to actions 
that further the purpose of the Code.  Accordingly, exercise of such authority requires a 
consideration of the Code’s overall objectives. 
 117 Because the Lothian court did not analyze recharacterization under § 105(a), it 
never explicitly acknowledged that furthering the priority scheme was an objective of the 
Code.  That omission does not impel the conclusion that the Fifth Circuit disagrees. 
 118 See, e.g., In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006); In re 
Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 225; In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 
748–49 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Hedged Invs. Assocs., 380 F.3d 1292, 1292 (10th Cir. 
2004). 
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In Lothian, the Fifth Circuit offered an inadequate explanation for 
its dismissal of § 105(a), but merely explained, “[b]ased on the above 
analysis, resort to § 105(a) is unnecessary.”119  In defending its decision 
not to use § 105(a), The Fifth Circuit opined that: 
[T]his court’s precedent reflects a cautious view of § 105(a).  For 
example, this court held that § 105 does not authorize bankruptcy 
courts to punish criminal contempt committed outside the court’s 
presence, in spite of the fact that other courts had approved using 
that section to authorize bankruptcy courts to punish civil 
contempt.120 
This explanation does not particularly advance the Fifth Circuit’s 
holding.  Referencing unrelated situations in which the court took 
caution in its use § 105(a) does not mean that the court can throw 
§ 105(a) to the wayside in favor of § 502(b).  Furthermore, the Fifth 
Circuit’s cautious take on § 105(a) in criminal situations has little 
bearing on the provision’s relevance to debt recharacterization. 
Perhaps most importantly, ending the inquiry at § 502(b) would 
negatively impact equity holders which, in turn, would prove deleterious 
not only for them, but also for businesses and the bankruptcy system at 
large.121  Undoubtedly, this approach would cause an unjust diminution 
of rights for at least some equity holders.122  If courts decide whether or 
not to allow a claim under § 502(b) based on the appropriateness of debt 
recharacterization, then those whom the court classifies as holders of 
equity will find themselves unable to bring any other rights they might 
have vis-à-vis the debtor.123  In Dornier, the Fourth Circuit took 
measures to avoid such an undesirable outcome.124  It insisted that if a 
claimant does have other rights against the debtor, the bankruptcy court 
must allow the claim to proceed under § 502(b), irrespective of whether 
the court would classify that claim as debt or as equity.125  Accordingly, 
even if the circuits were to agree that analysis under § 105(a) is 
unnecessary, bankruptcy courts could only end the inquiry at § 502(b) in 
                                                                                                             
 119 In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 120 Id. 
 121 See Matthew Nozemack, Making Sense Out of Bankruptcy Courts’ 
Recharacterization of Claims: Why Not Use § 510(c) Equitable Subordination?, 56 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 689, 705 (1999) (discussing how recharacterization negatively 
effects businesses, their potential funders, and the bankruptcy court system). 
 122 See In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 232–36. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
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situations in which the claim’s characterization is the only issue for the 
claimant. 
If nothing else, the Dornier opinion undoubtedly limits the 
disallowance power of bankruptcy courts to claimants who have no other 
rights vis-à-vis the debtor.126  Nonetheless, it seems unusual that the 
determination of the origin of bankruptcy courts’ authority for debt 
recharacterization should turn on whether a claimant has other rights 
against the debtor.  Under such a system, the recharacterization issue 
ceases to play a central role in the inquiry.  Moreover, if allowance under 
§ 502(b) hinges on the claimant’s other rights against the debtor—and 
not on whether the claimant is a holder of debt or of equity—then a 
recharacterization analysis serves no useful purpose at this stage in the 
process. 
Under the equitable subordination doctrine, one’s status as a 
corporate insider lowers the threshold requirement for the degree of 
misconduct necessary for the court to subordinate the claim.127  In 
AutoStyle Plastics, the Sixth Circuit considered the effects of insider 
status as it relates to the equitable subordination doctrine.128  The Sixth 
Circuit expressed concern with the ramifications of a reduced threshold 
requirement for insiders.129  The court opined that the excessive severity 
of equitable subordination is evidenced by the fact that it generates 
enough fear to induce investors to stop investing.130  Because 
recharacterization has the same financial consequences as equitable 
subordination,131 the Sixth Circuit’s analysis and concern applies equally 
to recharacterization.  That is, the harsh effects of recharacterization have 
a similar effect on corporate non-insiders as do the harsh effects of 
equitable subordination on a company’s insiders. 
In times of need, failing businesses often look first to their 
shareholders.132  The shareholders, or insiders, have a vested interest in 
the success of the business and are eager to see it succeed.133  Aware of 
that reality, businesses understand that the current shareholders are the 
most likely candidates to continue pouring money into the business.134  
Much to the chagrin of the businesses, the threat of debt 
                                                                                                             
 126 Id. 
 127 In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 745 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 In re Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 327 B.R. 389, 408 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005). 
 132 See, e.g., In re Octagon Roofing, 157 B.R. 852, 858 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
 133 In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 745. 
 134 Id. 
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recharacterization instills fear in their creditors.135  Creditors want 
assurance the debtors will repay their loans, and if a bankruptcy court 
recharacterizes the creditor’s loan as an equity contribution, the chances 
of repayment all but disappear.136  In turn, creditors become less likely to 
make loans to businesses in need.137  If creditors become less willing to 
lend their support to flailing businesses, then those businesses are less 
likely to stay afloat.138  For the business, this often means bankruptcy or 
dissolution.  For the employees, it means job loss.  For the shareholders, 
it means the loss of an investment.  In other words, the business’s failure 
benefits no one.  Accordingly, courts should endeavor to avoid that 
undesirable outcome. 
In practice, many businesses rely on insider loans.139  From a policy 
perspective, therefore, courts should encourage insider loans—not 
discourage them by threatening to subordinate the claims of those whose 
loan agreements result in litigation.140  Oftentimes, insiders are the only 
ones willing to provide loans to a struggling business.  As one court 
articulately explained, “[a]ny other analysis would discourage loans from 
insiders to companies facing financial difficulty and that would be 
unfortunate because it is the shareholders who are most likely to have the 
motivation to salvage a floundering company.”141  If, in fear of having 
their claims subordinated, insiders cease making such loans, then 
businesses that otherwise might have benefited from those loans will 
struggle to survive.142  Accordingly, courts should be loath to make 
                                                                                                             
 135 Id. at 747. 
 136 See In re Octagon Roofing, 157 B.R. at 858. 
 137 See In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 747 (describing the shareholders of a 
business involved in an equitable subordination claim). 
 138 See id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 In re Hyperion, 158 B.R. 555, 563 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1993).  See Patricia A. Redmond 
& Jessica D. Gabel, Not All Loans Are Created Equal: Equitable Subordination and 
Prepetition Insider Lending After Si Restructuring, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2008, at 22 
(averring that “recharacterization disincentivizes eleventh-hour restoration financing” and 
noting the irony that “many of the outside claims are paid from the insider advances in 
the wake of successful recharacterization and equitable estoppel claims”); see also 
Michael R. Tucker, Debt Recharacterization During an Economic Trough: Trashing 
Historical Tests to Avoid Discouraging Insider Lending, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 228 
(2010) (“However, inconsistent and ambiguous treatment of debt recharacterization 
discourages ‘owners and insiders of struggling [firms from undertaking legitimate] efforts 
to keep a flagging business afloat.’”) (quoting Sender v. Bronze Group, Ltd. (In re 
Hedged-Invs. Assocs.), 380 F.3d 1292, 1298 n.1 (10th Cir. 2004)). 
 141 In re Octagon Roofing, 157 B.R. at 858. 
 142 See In re Hyperion, 158 B.R. at 563. 
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insider status the most significant factor in determining the permissibility 
of equitable subordination. 
Courts impose a higher standard on insiders because insiders, 
owing to their relationship with the debtor, are more likely to engage in 
inequitable conduct than non-insiders, who lack any sort of special 
relationship with the debtor.143  The Fifth Circuit noted that insiders 
typically had “greater opportunities for . . . inequitable conduct.”144  If 
the importance of insider status stems only from its propensity to foster 
inequitable conduct, and inequitable conduct is a factor in § 510, but not 
in § 105 or § 502,145 then insider status does not seem applicable to an 
analysis of § 105 or § 502.  The court in Lothian recognized that 
“[e]quitable subordination and recharacterization, although sometimes 
based on the same facts, are directed at different conduct and have 
different remedies.”146  Even within the confines of equitable 
subordination, insider status is only one of many factors impacting a 
court’s decision to equitably subordinate a claim.147  Indeed, “the mere 
fact of an insider relationship is insufficient to warrant subordination.”148 
The consequences of equitable subordination and debt 
recharacterization differ in one significant way.  “When reviewing 
equitable subordination claims, courts impose a higher standard of 
conduct upon insiders.”149  This stems from the reality that equitable 
subordination requires a showing of inequity, and corporate insiders are 
more likely than corporate non-insiders to conduct themselves in such a 
manner.150  As a result, courts examine the conduct of insiders with a 
greater degree of scrutiny.151  In determining debt recharacterization 
under § 105(a), however, a bankruptcy court should not necessarily 
consider one’s status as an insider.  Debt recharacterization, unlike 
equitable subordination, does not require a showing of misconduct.152  
That brings into question the significance of insider status in a debt 
recharacterization case. 
                                                                                                             
 143 See In re Fabricators, 926 F.2d 1458, 1465 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 144 Id. 
 145 See, e.g., In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 544 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 146 Id. at 543; see also In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 745 (6th Cir. 
2001). 
 147 See In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 745. 
 148 In re Hyperion, 158 B.R. 555, 563 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1993). 
 149 In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 744. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
If the Supreme Court addresses this issue, it should disregard the 
Lothian approach.153  The Court recently denied Grossman’s petition for 
certiorari, thereby forfeiting the chance to halt this divisive issue in its 
incipiency.154  By introducing a new means of analyzing debt 
recharacterization, the Fifth Circuit, perhaps unwittingly, has laid the 
foundation for a polarizing circuit split.  The choice of approach could 
lead to a different outcome for recharacterization.  Because the circuits 
now disagree on the source of authority for debt recharacterization, it 
seems likely that bankruptcy courts will reach different conclusions 
when evaluating this issue.  Some courts will stop the inquiry at § 502(b) 
and others will continue to an analysis under § 105(a).  Inevitably, 
inconsistency will result.  Such inconsistency will generate a slew of 
negative consequences, including forum shopping.  In recharacterization 
cases, creditors and equity holders consistently want courts to 
characterize their claims as debt.  Accordingly, if the characterization of 
a claim depends on which court hears the claim, then claimants will seek 
out courts likely to characterize the claim as a debt instead of as equity.  
Such forum shopping dilutes the purpose of the Code and leads to 
excessive uncertainty regarding the outcome of a case. 
The inconsistency problem becomes especially apparent in view of 
the Lothian court’s promotion of the use of state law.  Using a Supreme 
Court decision that was issued before the creation of the Code, the 
Lothian court found that the relevance of insider status hinged on its 
relevance according to applicable state law.  Two obvious issues flow 
from the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on Butner.  First, the Supreme Court 
decided Butner before the promulgation of the Code, thereby lessening 
its value as a source of precedent.  Second, Butner encourages reliance 
on state law.  Not only does such an approach generate inconsistency, but 
it also offsets one of the main tenets of the Code—uniformity.  Congress 
did not codify bankruptcy law so that bankruptcy courts would make 
their decisions based on the state law that applied in that case. 
                                                                                                             
 153 Grossman’s attorney filed a petition for certiorari on December 20, 2011, which 
the Supreme Court denied on February 21, 2012.  The Court’s denial of Grossman’s 
petition means that the circuits will remain divided as to the correct approach for 
handling recharacterization.  When undecided courts are faced with this issue and forced 
to choose between the two approaches, the circuit split is likely to grow increasingly 
divisive.  Perhaps a more substantial divide will persuade the Court to resolve the issue. 
 154 See supra notes 87 and 153 and accompanying text. 
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Regardless of why the Court decides to address this issue, it should 
rule in favor of those who oppose the Lothian approach.155  The 
shortcomings of the Lothian approach render it an inappropriate stopping 
point in the evaluation of the debt-versus-equity inquiry.  Ironically, the 
Lothian court acknowledged the fact that debt recharacterization required 
a two-step inquiry.156  The court even criticized the district court for 
failing to consider the second step.157  Despite that acknowledgement, the 
Lothian court conflated two steps into one by suggesting that a 
recharacterization inquiry should occur simultaneously with the 
allowability determination under § 502(b). 
Grounding courts’ recharacterization authority in § 502 will result 
in an overabundance of recharacterization claims.  According to 
§ 502(b), a bankruptcy court must allow any claim to which no one has 
filed an objection.158  If bankruptcy courts must allow every such 
recharacterization claim, they will have no discretion with regard to 
determining the appropriateness of recharacterization.  By grounding the 
authority in § 105, however, the Court will ensure that bankruptcy courts 
make their decisions based on the equitable authority with which the 
Code has granted them—not because they must. 
Requiring bankruptcy courts to look beyond § 502(b) will promote 
the financing of troubled businesses and distill fears of potential 
contributors.  To circumvent the problems that arise from the Lothian 
approach, the Court can adopt either of two other approaches.  The first 
such approach entails an analysis under § 105(a) following any 
determination of allowability under § 502(b).  This approach mirrors that 
used by the majority of circuit courts in the pre-Lothian era.159  More 
than that, however, this approach aligns with the overall purpose of the 
Code and follows naturally from a reading from § 105(a).  As courts of 
equity, bankruptcy courts have the authority to take actions that further 
the purpose of the Code.160  It seems clear that such equitable authority 
would include the power to promote the priority scheme established in 
§ 726.  If a bankruptcy court finds that debt recharacterization is 
necessary to implement that priority scheme, then according to § 105(a), 
the bankruptcy court should have the authority to do so. 
                                                                                                             
 155 See, e.g., In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 749. 
 156 In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 157 Id. 
 158 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2006). 
 159 See, e.g., In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 749; In re Dornier Aviation, 
Inc., 453 F.3d at 231; In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 160 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006). 
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The second approach would require a § 105(a) analysis for only 
those claimants who have other rights vis-à-vis the debtor.  The Fourth 
Circuit discussed this concept at length in Dornier.161  Ending the 
analysis at § 502(b) is problematic because that section provides for the 
total allowance or disallowance of a claim.  Accordingly, if bankruptcy 
courts refuse to consider equity as a claim, then the claimant cannot 
proceed in any capacity.  In other words, the characterization under 
§ 502(b) ends the matter entirely.  By requiring courts to continue the 
evaluation for those claimants having further rights, the Court will dispel 
at least some of the concerns about disallowance under § 502(b). 
                                                                                                             
 161 See generally In re Dornier Aviation, Inc., 453 F.3d at 232–36. 
